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Three Models of Professional Reform
John Leubsdorf
In recent decades, the legal profession has taken a long step forward
into the nineteenth century. During the last few years alone, we have
witnessed striking changes. Courts have legalized price competition and
advertising among attorneys;' the National Labor Relations Board has
applied collective bargaining legislation to law firms; 2 Congress has created the Legal Services Corporation; 3 and the federal government has
preempted state regulation of union group legal services plans.4 Change
is continuing. The Federal Trade Commission, for instance, has been
prowling about the activities of bar associations for potential antitrust
violations, 5 and the American Bar Association plans to replace the Code
6
of Professional Responsibility.
It remains to be seen whether we are heading for some goal, rushing
off in all directions, or merely milling in the same place. Is it consistent
to trust the public to assess the spiels of competing lawyers, and also to
forbid conflicts of interest to which all clients consent? 7 Will measures to
j

Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful for'the help and support of

Colin Diver, Henry P. Monaghan, Dean William Schwartz, Aviam Soifer, and Kathleen A.
Sullivat.
S:See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (rule prohibiting attorney advertising
violates first amendment); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (attorney price
fixing violates Sherman Act).
2
See, e.g., Camden Regional Legal Servs., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 224 (1977); Foley, Hoag &
Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977); UNIONIZATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (BNA Special
Rept. 1981).
3 See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
4 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)(A), 1144; see also Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Employee Legal Serice Plans: Confict Between FederalandState Regulation, in LEGAL SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES
TO REGULATION 189-252 (1977). The Court had previously used the first and fourteenth
amendments to invalidate the bar's barriers against group legal service plans. E.g., United
Mineworkers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
5 See State BarAssociations Won't Get ABA Advice on FTC's Questionnaire, Uan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1001, at D-7 (Feb. 12, 1981); cf In re American
Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), afl'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), afdby an equal4y divided
court, American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 102 S. Ct. 1744 (1982) (FTC investigation of AMA for
anticompetitive practices).
6
ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Final
Draft]. In discussing the Model Rules, I have not gone beyond the 1981 draft to cover in
detail the version found in the Commission's June 30, 1982 Report to the House of Delegates,
which that House is now revising further. Winter, Lawyer Ethics on Trial, 68 A.B.A. J. 1197
(1982).
7 Compare Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising permitted) with
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make legal services more widely available by marketing them through
mass production clinics promote or subvert efforts to free clients from
domination by their own lawyers?8 Do present rules inhibit trial advocacy too much or not enough? 9 Commitment to change does not itself
reveal what changes are desirable. Without a definition of what constitutes improvement, we are likely to enact clashing solutions, or solutions
that will seem as self-interested as some of the currently challenged practices. Yet to draft a blueprint for reform in the abstract, without regard
for proposals now being pressed, would be foolish. Those proposals indicate where the shoe is thought to pinch, what repairs some find desirable, and what changes lie within the realm of possibility.
This article discusses three models of professional reform implicit in
current proposals. The first, a market view, seeks to provide the best
services at the lowest prices by permitting informed clients to choose
among competing lawyers and nonlawyers. The second model treats legal services as a public utility requiring regulatory intervention to increase its availability and efficiency; it regards the enforcement of legal
rights as a vital part of our governmental system. The third view, more
vague and with perhaps more radical implications, rests on a critique of
the personal relations between lawyer and client as manipulative and
alienating. Some extreme proponents of this third model even challenge
the necessity for lawyers.
I will refer to these models as the market, the public utility, and the
personal responsibility models. Each, however, has economic, political,
and personal implications of its own. These models are general approaches to change, not rigid schemes. They are ideal types, guides for
orientation, discussion, and evaluation of more specific proposals, rather
than closed systems that anyone would be likely to follow in every detail.' 0 Because each model responds to the weaknesses of the traditional
system of professional organization and behavior, the rise and fall of
that system is the natural starting point for presenting the models.
I
THE RISE AND FALL OF PROFESSIONALISM

In the last century we have witnessed an extraordinary transformaDevelopments in the Lau--Conflicts ofInterest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1244, 130306 (1981) (client cannot consent to attorney's conflict of interest in same case); seegenerally
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1980).
8 Compare Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977)
with D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
9 Compare M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980) (present system has excessive tolerance for efforts to distort the truth) with M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (advocating total dedication to client's case).
1o An author cited here as discussing a particular reform does not necessarily accept the
general model to which I relate it.
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tion of the practice of law. An organized legal profession emerged, one
that promulgated and occasionally enforced its own rules of professional
responsibility.I1 Graduation from a law school became a prerequisite for
admission to the bar.1 2 Lawyers excluded nonlawyers from a wide
range of legal activities, 13 while Jews, women, and Blacks strove with
varying degrees of success to enter the profession. 14 Single practitioners
yielded vast areas of practice to lawyers in large firms, corporations, and
government agencies. 15 More recently, lawyers formed legal aid societies, public defender offices, and the Legal Services Corporation to provide a variety of legal services to those unable to afford lawyers.' 6 A vast
expansion of the substantive law accompanied these changes, which in
turn required more and more lawyers 17 and generated an outpouring of
scholarly analysis and criticism.
The ideology that justified and perhaps influenced this transformation emphasized faith in lawyers. Clients were to entrust their affairs to
the professional judgment of counsel, who would serve them with selfless
devotion.' 8 In turn, the legal profession would protect clients from ignorance and unreliability by preventing them from hiring anyone not enlightened by a legal education and warrantied by bar membership. 19
Furthermore, the bar would prevent abuses by its own members
through the establishment and enforcement of rules, such as those pro20
tecting clients from the wiles of advertising attorneys.
11
In particular, lawyers formed the Ameri can Bar Association and other professional
organizations. See V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SOCIETY 412-30 (2d ed. 1976); J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 285-89 (1950).
On professional rules and their enforcement, see A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970); Armstrong, A Centu.7 of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063 (1978).

12 See Stevens, Two Cheersfor 1870 The American Law School, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 403 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
13 See Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Realy Make Good
Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 159.
14 See J.AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 65-66, 107-08, 125-29, 159, 184-88, 265, 293-95
(1976); C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN THE LAW (1981); W. LEONARD, BLACK LAWYERS (1977).
15

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,

THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 10-12

(1973); see J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); J. HURST, sutira note 11, at 306-08.
16 See E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM 37-103 (new ed. 1978); L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 40-41 (1965). The
Reagan administration has cut back but not yet destroyed the Legal Services Corporation.
17 Schwartz, The Reorganizationofthe Legal.Profession, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1980).
18 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4,5, 6, 7 (1980); Leub-

sdorf, Communicating With Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto andthe Clients Interests, 127

U. PA.L. REV. 68 (1979).
19 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101, DR 3-102, DR
3-103 (1980).
20 See id DR 2-101, DR 2-102, DR 2-103, DR 2-104, DR 2-105. The original, 1970
4'ersion of the Code regulated advertising and solicitation more stringently than the current
version. See also id Canons 1, 8 (lawyers' duty to maintain the profession's integrity and
competence and to improve the legal system).
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A second set of beliefs legitimized the legal system as a whole and
helped justify the autonomy of the legal profession. Lawyers portrayed
themselves not as powerful social actors but as invisible guardians who
helped clients assert rights. Any resulting injustice was attributable to
the courts and legislature that conferred those rights, or the client who
exercised them. 2 1 Such beliefs neutralized to some extent the traditional
reputation of lawyers for chicanery, 22 and the growing recognition that
social choice, not scientific expertise, establishes legal rules and
institutions.
In retrospect, legal professionalism mirrors the efforts of other professionals to seek autonomy, prestige, and profit. 23 Like other professionals, lawyers sought to protect their interests, 24 in part by securing a
governmentally-guaranteed monopoly. 25 They, like others, justified
their special treatment on the basis of their neutral scientific knowledge
(evolved and imparted by scholars and incomprehensible to the public)
and their disinterested devotion to the public interest.26 They evolved
an ideology demonstrating their profession's vital importance, and justifying its peculiar practices. 27 Lawyers also had several special advantages: they belonged to a traditional profession, had the training to
influence and infiltrate the governmental agencies from which protection and regulation flow, and worked in a society increasingly pervaded
by law.
Although the numbers, prosperity, and prestige of the legal profession show no signs of decline, the traditional principles of professional
practice are under heavy attack. 28 Critics, moreover, have cast doubt on
many of the assumptions that justified the traditional system. Proponents of alternative models argue that many rules, once defended as protecting clients, in fact subordinate clients' interests to those of their
21

See, e.g., Fried, The Lawyer as Friend." The MoralFoundationsof the Lawyer-ClientRelation,

86 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976); The Lawyer andHis Clients-CorrespondenceofMesrs. DavidDudley and
Dudley Field of the New York Bar, With Mr. Samuel Bowles, of the Springfield Republican (1871),
reprintedin partin A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 249-66 (1975).
22
See, e.g., G. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER 81-128 (1979); Ives, The Reputation of
the Common Lawyers in English Society, 150-1550, 7 BIRMINGHAM UNIV. HIST. J. 130 (1959-61).
23
See generaly M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
24 See

Green, The ABA as Trade Association, in

Green eds. 1976);

VERDICTS ON LAWYERS

(R. Nader & M.

C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT

(1966).
25 See Christensen, supra note 13; Friedman, Freedom of Contractand OccupationalLicensing
1890-1910. A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1965); Kessel, The A.M.A. and the
Suppo of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267 (1970).
26 See, e.g., F. BENNION, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1969); B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE
OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976).
27
See A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980).
28

See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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lawyers. 29 Even more unsettling is the realization that the traditional
emphasis on the attorney-client relationship is too narrow. Providing a
client with competent and devoted counsel increases the likelihood that
the two will inflict damage on opposing and unrepresented parties.
That advancing a client's interests in every way short of illegality will
promote justice seems less plausible than it once did, especially when
lawyers act outside the courtroom or when not everyone concerned is
30
competently represented.
Like the rise of professionalism, challenges to it have affected all
professions. Critics have portrayed the professionals' claims of neutral
expertise and concern for public welfare as masks for self-interest and
domination. 3 1 Even when professionals persuade the public that they
are so vital that the government should fund them, their success undermines their autonomy; regulation follows funding.3 2 Furthermore, market forces have weakened the ideal of a working relationship between a
professional on one side of the desk and a client on the other. More
frequently, professionals work for large institutions whose clients are
33
other large institutions.
The legal profession has not met outside criticism and pressure with
a united front. While some lawyers denounce the status quo and propose a variety of changes, others resist change or attempt to deflect it
with cosmetic code-making.3 4 Moreover, the profession itself is a house
divided. Different bar associations propose competing codes of conduct; 35 judges strike down bar rules; 36 and academics criticize the bench,
the bar, and each other. The practicing bar is further divided by class,
ethnic origin, prestige, income, and clientele. 3 7 Thus, it is not surprising
29

See, e.g., Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV.

702 (1977). See generally J.
30

LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978).
See M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); D. Luban, The Adversary System Ex-

cuse (Center for Philos. & Pub. Policy, U. Md. 1981); Califano, The Washington Lawyer: When
to Say No, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 187 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976); Schwartz, The
ProfessionalismandAccountability ofLawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978); Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy.- ProceduralJusticeand ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
31 See, e.g., I. ILLIGH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS (1977); Barber, Controland Responsibility in
the Powerful Professions, 93 POL. Sci. Q. 599 (1978-79); authorities cited supra notes 23-26.
32 See, e.g., E. JOHNSON, supra note 16; W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION
387-438 (1978); R. & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA (1974).
33 See Engel & Hill, The Growing Industrializationof the Professions, in THE PROFESSIONS
AND THEIR PROSPECTS 75 (E. Freidson ed. 1973).
34 See Frug, The Proposed Revisions Of The Code Of ProfessionalResponsibility: Solving The
Crisis Of Professionalism, Or Legitimating The Status Quo?, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1121 (1980-81).
35 Compare Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, with AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (1980).
36 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ban on lawyer advertising
invalidated); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule
struck down).
37 See V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN &T. SCHNEYER,upra note 11, at 1-61; Laumann &
Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B.
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that currents of change are flowing in different directions.
Each of the following models of professional reform addresses the
loss of consensus within the legal profession and within society. The
market model views society as an aggregate of personal desires, whose
satisfaction can be maximized by unfettered private contracts. The
public utility model probes deeper; it views the marketplace itself as an
institution in which some impose decisions on others. Nevertheless, the
public utility model hopes that a democratically-constituted political
order can protect the public interest. The personal responsibility model,
on the other hand, rejects this hope of a political solution; it finds the
current political order just as assailable as the economic order. The professional responsibility model abandons the search for consensus, and
calls on each lawyer to follow his own moral and political insights.
II
A

MARKET MODEL

The movement to dismantle barriers to competition in providing
legal services has been one of the most striking developments in the legal
profession. Trust in the market has replaced professional regulation as a
means of preventing abuse. Lawyers are suddenly free to advertise, solicit clients, 38 lower their prices,39 and devise new arrangements to deliver their services more economically. 4° The ABA's barriers against
practice by nonlawyers have begun to crumble.4 ' Even law schools face
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 155; Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canonsas a
Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 244, 250-66 (1968).
38 See, e.g., In re R-M. J-,
102 S. Ct. 929 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (Court relies on market theory in upholding newspaper advertising); Koffler v. Joint
Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140,412 N.E.2d 927, 532 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026
(1981) (written solicitation); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West 1977), Rule 2-101 (1982)
(written solicitation); see also Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976) (using free market and first amendment reasoning to invalidate ban on drug
price advertising). See general.y L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING
AND SOLICITATION (1980).
39 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); see also Winter, See Fee
Changesfor Assigned Counsel, 67 A.B.A. J. 32 (1981) (competitive bidding).
40 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(4) (1980)
(group legal services); J. JENKINS, FUTURE LAW: LAWYERS CONFRONT THE 21ST CENTURY
8-9 (1979) (legal clinic with offices in two states); Podgers, Tort Defense Law Firmsto Affiliate, 66
A.B.A. J. 437 (1980). One commentator has argued that the developments described in the
text do not reflect a genuine commitment to competition, but instead are part of an effort to
expand the demand for legal services to maintain the income of an expanding bar. Abel, Why
Does the ABA tomulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REv. 639, 657-62 (1981).
41 Christensen, supra note 13, at 160, 197-200; see Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins.
Agency, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right
of criminal defendant to represent himself; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419-22
(1974) (unconstitutional to bar law students and paralegals from interviewing prisoners);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (prohibition against legal assistance by prisoners
unlawful).
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unaccustomed competition as a result of California's authorization of
law schools without national accreditation. 42 Important in themselves,
these changes may prompt even more important changes in the way
that society provides legal services, for the assumptions underlying the
market model differ radically from traditional assumptions. If carried
to their extreme, these assumptions call for changes in virtually every
aspect of legal life.
A.

Premises and Problems

Reliance on the market presupposes that clients are able to choose
lawyers (or nonlawyers) to represent them, to make satisfactory arrangements with their representatives, and to police those arrangements
themselves. These presuppositions are very different from the traditional assumption that clients need protection because legal matters are
too complex for them, and because the trust that clients should repose in
their lawyers discourages scrutiny of their lawyers' performance. That
traditional assumption has recently been reborn in economic form, as
commentators argue that professionals can create demand for their own
services.4 3 Of course, in our society the market reigns in many areas in
which consumers have difficulty choosing among competing products.
And even if one accepts the assumption of client vulnerability, it does
not necessarily follow that the traditional system adequately protects clients. Indeed, market proponents argue that market restrictions are
more likely to impoverish clients than to improve the quality of the legal
services that they receive.
Several problems are inherent in the market model. Assuming that
a client can safeguard his own interests, what effect does the lawyer have
on third parties? A lawyer acting as a lobbyist or corporate adviser
helps his client to affect consumers, pollution victims, and others. Similarly, a litigator's impact may extend beyond the parties to nonparties
affected by the case or the precedent it establishes. Indeed, clients typically hire lawyers to protect their own interests by limiting those of
others. Market believers, like believers in the traditional scheme of professional regulation, tend to disregard these externalities. Proponents of
the market model need not, however, subscribe to the traditional assertion that nonclients will be protected by the adversary system and their
own lawyers. They might confine reliance on the market to transactions
42 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060.9 (West 1974) provides that "[a]pproval of any
agency or agencies not existing under and by virtue of the law of this State shall not be made
a condition for accredition of any California law school."; BarExam Statistics,55 CAL. ST. B.J.
91 (1980). See generaly Fossum, Law School Accreditation Standards and the Structure of American
Legal Education, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 515.
43 See, e.g., Evans, Professionals and the Production Function: Can Competition Poliy Improve
E enc, in the Licensed ftofessions?, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 225,
250-59 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980).
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that generate few externalities. Alternatively, they might grant nonclients a cause of action against the lawyer or client who has harmed
them, thereby forcing him to secure the consent of nonparties in advance or to bear the consequences of failing to do so. 44 Nonclient victims might also be allowed to buy off the lawyer or his client in
advance. 45 In one way or another, those who wish to justify reliance on
the market must address the impact of lawyers on nonclients.
A second problem with the market approach is that only those
with money or other assets can participate in a market. 46 The market
model, therefore, implies that the poor will not participate in the legal
services market. This approach departs from traditional thought which
insists, at least in theory, that all individuals have access to legal services. 47 To correct this weakness, a market proponent might support a
proposal to redistribute wealth, enabling everyone to afford a lawyer.
The market proponent would be hard pressed, however, to justify subsidizing legal services for the poor, who might consider other benefits
more valuable. 48 Subsidizing legal services implies that the public has
an interest in the availability of some legal service to all, the market
notwithstanding.
Finally, a market approach, almost by definition, requires that
neither the government nor the bar regulate private arrangements for
legal services. Under the traditional system, the government implements the bar's rules by controlling admission to legal practice, banning
the unauthorized practice of law, and imposing the bar's standards of
behavior on lawyers. A market approach would reduce, but not eliminate, even this minor governmental role. At the very least, the market
approach would require the government to enforce contracts between
lawyers and clients, and between lawyers and their partners or co-workers. The government, moreover, defines the substantive rights that lawyers enforce and establishes the procedures for enforcement. The ideal
of a market free of governmental involvement-always a paradoxical
one-thus seems particularly unattainable when the organization of legal services is concerned.

44
45
46

See infia notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
See generaly Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
The other assets include monetary claims substantial enough to attract contingent fee

lawyers.
E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16 (1980).
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 355-59 (2d ed. 1977); Humbach, Serving
the PublicInterest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J. 564, 565 (1979); cf. M.FRIEDMAN, CAPI47

48

TALISM AND FREEDOM 177-95 (1962) (criticizing social welfare programs but supporting negative income tax); Landes,An Economic Analysis of the Court, 14 J. L. & EON. 61, 74-77 (1971)
(criticizing free courts).
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The Market Model's Applications

Among the most important applications of the market approach is
the elimination of restraints on who may practice law. As long as they
do not misrepresent their credentials, the model frees lawyers to compete
with lawyers for discerning customers 49 and lawyers from other states to
compete with in-state lawyers.50 Courts should also permit litigants to
conduct and argue their own cases.5 1
The market model's impact on requirements for lawyer certification is less clear. Admission to the bar might be abolished, leaving everyone free to peddle his credentials, or admission to the bar might be
retained as a labeling device.5 2 A less drastic alternative would be to
retain the bar admission requirement, but reduce the requirements
needed to become admitted, for instance by requiring only two years of
law school. 5 3 Law schools could then compete for students by offering
shorter and less expensive courses of study without being restrained by
54
accreditation agencies.
As traditional restraints on law firms5 5 were abolished, lawyers

would taste all of the delights of capitalism. Nationwide law firms,
franchising arrangements, 56 group legal service plans, and legal insur49 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 346-48 (1972); Christensen, supra note
13; Kennedy, The Lawyer as Professional: Examination, Licensing, and the Problemof Deceptive Packaging, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 601 (1979). See generall OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGU-

LATION (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980). In England nonlawyers are free to perform many although
not all "legal" functions. THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 203-31,
243-86 (1979) (Cmd. 7648).
50 See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 445-58 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brakel & Loh,
Regulating the Multistate Practiceof Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699 (1975); Note, A Constitutional
Ana~ysis of State Bar Resideney Requirements, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1461 (1979). See generall
Pashigian, Occupational Licensing and the Interstate Mobility of Professionals, 22 J.L. & EcON. 1

(1979); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982).
51 See Project, The UnauthorizedPracticeof Law andPro Se Divorce: An EmpirialAnasis, 86
YALE LJ. 104 (1976).
52 Similar labeling might be provided for professionals and paralegals. Proponents of
the market model, however, are likely to oppose this system. See, e.g., Elzinga, The Compass of
CompetitionforProfessionalSerwices,in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 107 (R. Blair & S. Rubin
eds. 1980).
53

See, e.g., Stolz, Trainingforthe PublicProfession of the Law (1921): A ContemporaqReview,

in H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEw DIRECTIONS

IN LEGAL EDUCATION

227 (1972); Ass'n of

Am. Law Schools, Trainingforthe PublicProfessionsofthe Law: 1971 (the "Carrington Report"),

in id at 106-07, 117-19, 143-47.
54

See First, Competition in the Legal Education ndustoy (pts. I & 2), 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311

(1978), 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1049 (1979); authorities cited supra note 42. For a description of
anticompetitive collusion between law schools, see Stolz, The Two-Year Law School: The Day the
Music Died, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 37 (1973).
55

See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D), DR 3-101,

DR 3-102, DR 3-103 (1980).
56 See M. POLLARD & R.

LEIBENLUFT, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 6,
61 (FTC 1981) (retail dental clinics); The Nationwide Law Firm Aimsfor Middle Income Litigants,

64 A.B.A.J. 1481 (1978) (law firm expands to fill middle-class market); authorities cited supra
note 40.
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ance would flourish. 5 7 Lawyers might form partnerships with marketing
professionals, or they might market their services through profit-making
corporations controlled by nonlawyers.5 8 Law firms, moreover, could
use modern management techniques to chart their growth and train and
control their lawyers, paralegals, and staff personnel.5 9 In that environment, traditions of craftsmanship and autonomy 60 might yield to standardization and bureaucratization. 6 1 The right of lawyers and law firm
employees to unionize 62 might then take on increased importance.
The ability to advertise 6 3 and to solicit 64 clients without traditional
restraints should foster the development of larger firms. Only advertising can generate the business needed to support mass-production techniques, and only large firms can afford the advertising campaigns
needed to create their reputations. Unhindered competition may, therefore, lead to its own demise, or at least to the demise of some benefits
that market theorists expect. Oligopolists able to create their own demand through advertising, rather than quality or low cost, may come to
65
dominate the legal services market.
If the market model benefits clients
keeping prices down. The elimination of
ready opened the way to more vigorous
legitimation of some price advertising6 7
57

W.

at all, it should be through
minimum fee scales 66 has alprice competition, while the
has made price information

PFENNIGSTORF, LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE:

THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN

FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES (1975); see also Schwartz, Foreword- Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 279 (1965).
5E
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, Rule 5.4; Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code of Professional Standards, 57 N.C.L. REV. 559, 579-821 (1979); cf. In re American
Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1016-18 (1979), enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), afdby an
equaly divided court, American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 102 S. Ct. 1744 (1982) (restraint on
physician association with nonphysicians constitutes unfair trade practice); Evans, supra note
43, at 239-50 (dominance of professional firms by the professionals is inefficient).
59 See Montagna, The PublicAccounting Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS 135 (E. Freidson ed. 1973) (describing large accounting firms). See generaly Cantor,
Managing Legal Organizationsin the 1980"r, 11 U. ToL. L. REV. 311 (1980); J. JENKINS, supra
note 40, at 10.
60 See Nelson, Practiceand Privilege: Social Change and the Structure ofLarge Law Fims, 1981
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 97.
61 Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 Tax. L. REV. 1269, 1274-88
(1980); see H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1977); Engel, The Standardization of Lawyers' Serices, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 817.
62 See supra note 2.
63 Authorities cited supra note 38. See generaly Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints
on Advertising and Soliciting By Attomqs, 62 VA. L. REV. 1135 (1976).
64 Id; CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 2-101 (1982).
65 See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 198-212 (2d ed. 1971). But see
Demsetz, Advertising in the Afflent Society, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 67 (Y. Brozen ed.
1974).
66 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
67 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1980); authorities cited
supra note 38; cf Benham, The Eect ofAdvertising on the Price (Eyeglases, 15 J.L. & EcON. 337
(1972) (advertising lowers prices).
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more accessible to consumers. Competitive bidding6 8 and legal services
purchased with credit cards and bank loans 69 are on the way. Market
logic would also authorize lawyers to advance a client's litigation expenses and to accept divorce and criminal cases on a contingent fee basis. 70 Yet clients could suffer from the abolition of price restrictions.
The same antitrust laws that condemn the minimum fee also forbid

maximum price-fixing arrangements, including, perhaps, bar restrictions on unreasonably high fees; 7 ' laissez-faire principles would allow
72
even the most exorbitant fees as long as the client agrees to them.
Under the market view, the duties a lawyer owes to a client should
be as negotiable as their price. If a client can hire an untrained lawyer
to transact his legal business, he should also be able to hire a lawyer who
will devote only a few hours to the case. Conversely, the lawyer should
be able to insist on skimpy representation as a condition of accepting the
case. 73 Similarly, the lawyer might try to increase his income and publicity by insisting on the power to make settlement decisions or to control other aspects of the case. 74 Even the lawyer's duties of loyalty and
confidentiality, as traditionally conceived, 75 might be bargained away.
Indeed, there are already tendencies in that direction. Courts, for example, have permitted sophisticated clients to waive their rights to require
their lawyers to decline representation of other clients who might pose a
potential conflict of interest. 76 Some have urged that lawyers be free to
68 See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1012-15 (1979), enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), a"dby
an equal.y dividedcourt, American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 102 S. Ct. 1744 (1982) (AMA practice
setting minimum fee level illegal); Winter, supra note 39.
69 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 338 (1974);
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1980, at 3, col. 1 (loans to finance suits); PublicIs Cool to Lawsuit Stock, 63
A.B.A. J. 166 (1977) (sale of stock interest in lawsuit).
70 See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, Rule 1.5(c); Huber, supra note 58, at 588-95.
But see Person v. Association of the Bar, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding prohibition
on contingent fees for expert witnesses).
71 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
72 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 981 (1979) (enforcing contract for one-million dollar minimum fee for preparing
certiorari petition).
73 See Boston Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. No. 79-3, repintedin
24 Bos. Bj. 24 (1980) (lawyer may comply with client's request for cursory opinion); cf. S.
NAGEL & M. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 217-48 (1979) (using portfolio theory to analyze how lawyer should allocate his time among cases to maximize his
profit); Epstein, MedicalMalpractice: The Casefor Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
87 (contracting out of medical malpractice liability).
74 See L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY 199-200 (1973); D. ROSENTHAL, sura
note 8.
75 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
76 E.g., Interstate Properties v. Pyramid Co., 574 F. Supp. 178, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 203-05 (N.D. Ohio
1976), af'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Note, Prospective
Waiver of the Right to Disquali.§ Counselfor Conflicts of Interest, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1074 (1981).
On waiver of the right to confidentiality, see Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 621-
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77
act as intermediaries between negotiating parties.
Would such an approach leave a client with any protection against
her lawyer? She could buy insurance78 or insist that the employment
contract include appropriate restrictions. Even without an explicit
agreement, customary expectations 79 or the lawyer's representations
might give rise to implicit restrictions.8 0 Clients, however, are unlikely
to foresee all the dangers of hiring an unconstrained attorney and cannot easily change lawyers in the middle of a case. The law could meet
this problem, albeit at some sacrifice of pure market principles, by requiring the lawyer to secure the client's informed consent before departing from traditional norms.8 1 Two sources of exploitation would still
remain: the market power of lawyers, and the trust with which clients
are encouraged to approach lawyers. Market proponents would argue
that the reforms already mentioned would dispel any lawyer market
82
power. Moreover, they would replace whatever trust in lawyers exists
with a more critical approach to attorney-client relationships, an approach appropriate for dealing with self-interested businessmen. 83 Market proponents would further claim that when lawyers now refrain from
abusing their clients, they do so not because of rarely-enforced legal requirements and professional canons, but because of their own principles
and their desire, stimulated by the market, to secure the confidence of
clients and colleagues.
The difficulties of protecting clients in a market system pale in comparison to those of protecting nonclients. Some marketeers might indeed

22, 639 P.2d 248, 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. 277, 186-87 (1982) (criminal defendant may sell publication rights to obtain counsel).
77
See, e.g., Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, Rule 2.2; Note, &multaneous Representation
TransactionResolution in the Adversa- System, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 86 (1977); see also Frank,
The LegalEthicsof Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REiv. 683, 698-703 (1965) (Brandeis as "counsel for the situation").
78 See Havighurst, "Medical Adversi Insurance'--HasIts Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1233.
79 See Epstein, supra note 73.
80 Steinberg & Rosen, Legal Advertising and Warranty Liabiliy: "Let the Lawyer Beware,"
1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 443.
81 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.5(b), (c) (Discussion Draft
1980) [hereinafter cited as Discussion Draft] (watered down in Proposed Final Draft, supra
note 6, Rule 1.2(c) (1981)); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979). Such measures would sacrifice pure market
principles because they assume that clients neglect their own best interests, and because they
impose on lawyers and clients who do not explicitly agree otherwise terms that are not based
on what the parties have agreed to or would agree to.
82 See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 230-32 (1977) (reporting generally high opinions of lawyers' trustworthiness
to client, but also widespread beliefs that lawyers will help client with unethical or illegal
behavior).
83 See Burt, Confict and Trust Between Attorne and Client, 69 GEO. LJ. 1015 (1981) (arguing that hostility between lawyers and clients is inevitable and should be brought into the
open).
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stop at this point and keep the present prohibitions against injuring nonclients. The current Code of Professional Responsibility contains only a
few such prohibitions, and most of these forbid conduct that is plainly
illegitimate in even the most boisterous market, such as bribing witnesses and officials, using fraud and deceit, and aiding a client's illegal
schemes. 84 All but two of the remaining prohibitions 85 are directed primarily against the overzealous conduct of litigation. They prohibit lawyers from asserting baseless claims, 86 communicating with a represented
party without his lawyer's permission, 87 using threats of criminal prosecution to extort concessions, 88 and prejudicing the tribunal with pretrial
publicity.8 9 One might internalize the costs of such conduct by making
the offending lawyer liable for them. 90 The same approach could be
used when lawyers injure nonclient third parties. 9' A market approach,
however, does not compel such liabilities; it is also compatible with a
system under which lawyers and their clients are free to harm third parties, whose only recourse is to buy them off if they can. The economic
reasoning behind the market approach does not determine what rights
should be allocated to whom. 92 Society makes such determinations
when it decides, for instance, whether a lawyer whose client tells him
that he is considering baseless litigation against an enemy has a right to
keep the disclosure secret, or whether the lawyer must inform the enemy
of that fact.
84
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), DR 7-102(A)
(4), (5), (6), (7), DR 7-109(c), DR 7-110(A), DR 8-101 (1980).
85 Id DR 7-106(C)(2), DR 8-102 (protecting witnesses from harassment and judges from

abuse).
86

Id DR 7-102(A)(1), (2), DR 7-103(A).

87
88

Id DR 7-104(A)(1).
Id DR 7-105.
89 Id DR 7-107, DR 7-108; see Stewart, Professional Ethics for the Business Lawyer. The
Morals of the Market Place, 31 Bus. LAW 463, 467 (1975) (legal ethics reflect a few precepts of

decency and common sense, plus enlightened self-interest).
90 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927, amended by Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3,94 Stat. 1156 (Supp. 1981) (lawyer liable for costs and attorney's fees
caused by unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings); Greenbaum, Physician
Countersuits: A Cause Without Action, 12 PAc. L.J. 745 (1981) (urging courts and legislatures to
relax their discouragement of suits by physicians against lawyers who sue them unsuccessfully
for malpractice).
91 See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (liability of corporate lawyer
who prepared document for transactions to defraud stockholder); Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) (liability of psychiatrist
for failing to warn stranger of his client's threat), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961)
(liability of lawyer to frustrated beneficiaries of will he negligently drafted), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962); Parker, Attorney Liabilip Under the Securities Laws 4jer Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 521 (1977) (attorney liability to investing public).
92

See, e.g., Horwitz, Law AndEconomics: Science OrPolitics, 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 905,905-

06 (1980); Kennedy & Michelman, Are Properl And ContractEftient?, 8
(1980).

HoFSTRA

L. REV. 711
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The market approach, moreover, does not provide any clear answers for reforming the procedural system within which legal services
are rendered. Few market proponents would leave adjudication entirely
to private agreements; indeed, a court system empowered to enforce
93
contracts and to prevent theft is a prerequisite for a market system.
Those who approve of the market approach because of a libertarian belief that it maximizes individual autonomy 94 might approve the present
adversary system, for it too values individualism. These market proponents, however, would probably support changes that broaden the rights
of the parties to contract for extra-judicial alternatives, such as arbitration or mediation. 95
Those who value the market because they believe that it maximizes
society's wealth, rather than for libertarian reasons, 96 might reshape the
court system to increase efficiency by curbing adjudication and error
costs. 9 7 The adversary system is inefficient; it requires each party to pay

for its own investigation of a case and then pays a judge and jury to go
over the ground once again. 98 The present financing system, which requires each party to pay his own counsel fees (except in special circumstances) and the state to pay for the court system, increases this
inefficiency. Parties have little incentive to minimize the costs of their
opponents and of the court system; indeed, they often benefit by increasing those costs. Reformers interested in efficiency, therefore, would be
likely to replace the adversary system with one in which a neutral judge
or agency investigates the case, and either both parties or the losing
party bears the full costs. 99
Whatever effects a market revolution might have on lawyers and
courts, it is not likely to help those without money.1 00 Even if, as some
have claimed, subsidized legal services can remedy the market failure
that occurs when group members cannot unite,' 0 many legal problems
93
94

See P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 71, 329-32 (1979).
See Epstein, Causationand Correctivejustice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.

477, 487-504 (1979); see also Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457
(1979).
95 See Christensen, Trivate Justice: Califonia's General Reference Procedure, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 79 (trial of cases by retired judges).
96 See Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theog, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
On the distinction between the libertarian and the efficiency approach, see Epstein, supra note
94.
97 R. POSNER, supra note 49, at 333-56; see Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
98

G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 87-99 (1980).

99 See id; R. POSNER, supra note 49, at 350-51, 354-56; Landes, supra note 48.
100 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
101 See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978). Even in such situations, it is not
clear that legal action will permanently help the group. See Galanter, Wh the '"aves"Come
Out Ahead- Specudatious on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 140-41 (1974);
Hazard, SocialJusticethrough Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.699 (1969).
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of the poor-for example, domestic relations problems-would not
qualify for this remedy. Although market reforms might reduce the cost
of legal services and enable indigents with valuable claims to finance
legal proceedings by borrowing against their claims,' 0 2 many poor peo03
ple with perceived legal needs would remain without lawyers. 1 If soci-

ety decides to fill part of this gap, about the only advice that market
proponents can offer is to select a Judicare system that enables subsidized clients to choose lawyers as do other market participants. 10 4 Even
this advice is questionable. In the medical profession, for example, some
argue that fostering competition among group service organizations is
more promising than waiting for a genuine market to develop between
physicians and patients.10 5 At this point, we arrive where we began:
skeptical of whether the ideal of a free market resembles anything that is
likely to exist between buyers and sellers of legal services or, indeed,
anywhere in today's economy.
III
A

PUBLIC UTILITY MODEL

Instead of relying on competition, other theorists call on the government to regulate the legal profession as a public utility. 06 One
might justify regulation of the legal profession, like regulation of other
public utilities, by arguing that a monopoly requires control. This argument, however, is wrong-the legal services market is neither a monopoly nor an oligopoly in the economic sense. Reforms, such as those that
market theorists propose, could abate many of the anticompetitive practices now present in the legal services market. The inherently political
function of the bar in controlling the ability of citizens to enforce their
rights, and in shaping the law that defines those rights, yields better
justifications for regulating the legal services market. The legal profession's public and quasi-governmental function has long been recognized
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
Seegeneralo, B. CURRAN, supira note 72; 1 ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO THE
POOR, REPORT ON THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR IN BOSTON 23-64 (R. Spangenberg
102
103

dir. 1977).
See S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE (1974).
105 The group service organizations contract to insure all of a subscriber's medical needs
and may be both sophisticated enough and strong enough to control physicians. L.
104

GOLDBERG & W. GREENBERG, THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON COMPETITION (1977) (FTC Staff Report); Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organiza-

lions and the Marketfor Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716 (1970). For similar
points in the legal context, see S. TISHER, infra note 108, at 32-35, 81-82.
106 The public utility analogy is set forth in F. MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FORTINSKY,
THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 288-93 (1972). The authors

use the analogy primarily to argue that lawyers should be required to represent the unrepresented. I do not know if the authors would accept all of my applications of the analogy.
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as a ground for treating it differently from a club or a business.10 7
Because of the public utility approach's concern with the legal profession's public and quasi-governmental function, it diverges from both
the traditional professional approach and the market approach. The
model goes beyond an examination of the relations between clients and
their lawyers to consider representation for the unrepresented, the impact of lawyers on nonclients, and the relationship between what lawyers do and the substantive and procedural law with which they deal.
The model also differs from the traditional and market approaches because it relies on government regulation, not just on self-regulation or
the discipline of the market. The public utility model, however, is flexible or formless enough to recognize a potential regulatory role for both
the profession and the market. Even those without a commitment to
laissez-faire economics, for instance, can support legal advertising as a
way to make legal services cheaper and more accessible to the public.108
The public utility approach, in short, is the theoretical counterpart of
the mixture of competition, organization, and regulation that characterizes most of our economy.
Perhaps because of its flexibility, the public utility model recently
has influenced the legal services market more than the more intellectually incisive market model. Measures to represent the formerly unrepresented have been particularly prominent: the Legal Services
Corporation has helped poor people in civil matters, 09 and courts have
required counsel in many criminal actions' l lo Furthermore, the Court
and the bar have recognized the right of workers to join group legal
services plans,"' and Congress has passed legislation encouraging such
plans. 12 A variety of groups and interests, following the example set by
Blacks," I 3 have secured representation by public interest law organizations."14 Finally, law schools have tried to introduce minorities and women into the profession;" I5 the public utility approach supports such
107 See, e.g., A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 37-43, 237
(1921) (discussing free access to the profession).
108

See, e.g., S. TISHER, L. BERNABEI & M. GREEN, BRINGING THE BAR To JUSTICE: A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF Six BAR ASSOCIATIONS

(1977).

109 See, e.g., E. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 187-234.
110 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
LI
See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(4) (1980).
112 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(8) (1976 & Supp. 1980) (legalizing employer contributions to
union plans that offset legal fees); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)(A), 1144 (1976) (welfare plans can
include prepaid legal services; state regulation preempted); I.R.C. § 120 (1981) (employer
contributions not taxable to employees).
113 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
114 See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
(1976); PUBLIC INTEREST LAw (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978); see Rev. Proc. 75-13, § 3, 1975-1 C.B.
662 (requirements for tax-exempt public interest firm).
115 See authorities cited supra note 14.
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efforts because they improve legal representation for these groups and
bring some of their members into the legal system.
The public utility approach has also effected reforms that do not
create more positions for lawyers. The hegemony of the organized bar
has been shaken as courts, t16 government officials," i7 and nonlawyers t t8
took a hand in professional matters. The government has occasionally
sought to encourage nonlitigious dispute resolution, 119 use trained
nonlawyers in administrative proceedings, 20 and eliminate complex litigation issues.' 2' Yet, as with the market approach, past attempts to implement the public utility approach have not realized the model's
potential.
A.

Premises and Problems

The public utility approach rejects the central premise of the market theory: that consumers can obtain adequate legal services through
private transactions in the market, without outside help. It would take
far more than legal advertising services to. enable those ignorant of the
law to make a truly informed choice. 122 No matter how informed and
vigilant a client is, the organization of the legal system in general, and
legal offices in particular, make it virtually impossible to receive legal
help that is both effective and cheap. Reformers must, therefore, go beyond the market to implement their goals.
The government, of course, may not succeed where the market has
failed. Indeed, some current problems result from government rather
than market action. One might question whether those unable to protect themselves as consumers will be more effective when they act as
citizens, and whether lawyers' inertia and self-interest which resist market forces so successfully will be more likely to succumb to political
116 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 1, 98, 100. The increase in disciplinary proceedings,
legal malpractice suits, counsel disqualification motions, and claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel is bringing an expanding number of professional issues before the courts; court decisions are beginning to outweigh bar association ethics opinions in defining professional
standards.
117 See, e.g., authorities cited supra notes 2, 4, 6; Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer
Refonn, 27 STAN. L. REv. 333 (1975); Speech of President Carter, I PUBLIC PAPERS: JIMMY
CARTER 834 (May 4, 1978).
118 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996c(a), 2996f(c) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) (composition of boards of Legal Services Corporation and grantees respectively); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6013.5, 6086.6 (West Supp. 1981);see Wolfram, Barriers1o
Effective Public Participationin Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1978).
1'9 Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (1980); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)
(1976) (encouraging manufacturers to set up informal dispute resolution procedures).
120
Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering Process Through A New Delivey System." The Emergence andState of Legal Paraprofessionalism,71 COLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1189-1210 (1971); see KY.
Sup. CT. R. 3.700(2) (1982) (paralegal may practice law under lawyer's supervision).
121
See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAv §§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) (no-fault automobile
insurance); Project, supra note 51, at 106-09 (no-fault divorce).
122 See generalj ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN SOCIETY (1974).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1038

[Vol. 67:1021

123

measures.
Just as they reject the idea that the market's invisible hand will
protect clients, proponents of the public utility model reject the idea
that the adversary system will protect represented adverse parties. They
view the courtroom, at least in part, as a political arena, in which parties
with wealth and power can rely on their resources to drown their adversaries in a flood of high-priced legal talent. These resources are even
more effective in negotiating, lobbying, and other areas in which the
adversary system does not purport to operate.1 24 At the very least, countervailing measures are needed to enhance equal representation. Yet if
all forums are political, those with greater wealth and power will usually
prevail, even when their opponents are well represented.1 25 One appropriate role for the lawyer who represents the poor and weak, therefore,
will be to aid those groups in their efforts to increase their power. 126
According to the public utility model, access to legal services is essential to full citizenship.' 27 Without lawyers, people and groups cannot
participate effectively in the governmental system, or enforce rights that
the system provides them. A predominant aim of public utility thinkers,
therefore, has been to extend legal services to the poor and to members
of other disadvantaged groups. Some, of course, criticize this transcendent view of the importance of lawyers. They argue that people often
find many goods and services more desirable than legal services, and
that to enforce the law completely would be expensive, intrusive, and
28
disruptive. 1
Because providing legal services is an essential part of our political
system, the public utility approach will not relinquish the responsibility
for regulating legal services to nongovernmental entities, including the
bar or the market. Indeed, government involvement is unavoidable.
The rights and remedies that the government creates inevitably shape
the organization and behavior of the legal profession. The adversary
system itself, for instance, rewards some kinds of lawyer behavior, but
requires other behavior to be forbidden for the system to work fairly and
123

See, e.g., Weingast, Physicians,DNA Research Scientists, and the Marketfor Lemons, in REG-

ULATING THE PROFESSIONS 81 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
124
See, e.g., M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT (1975).

125 Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can RedistributingLawyers' Services Achieve Socialjustice?, 1 L. & POLICY Q. 5 (1979); Galanter, supra note 101.
126 Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049 (1970).
127 Breger, Legal Aidfor the Poor: A ConceptualAnalsi, 60 N.C.L. REV. 281 (1982); Brickman, Of ArterialPassageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of UniversalAccess to Courts and
Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595 (1973); Stumpf, Law andPoverty: A PoliticalPerspective, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 694; see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1962).
128 Friedman, Access toJustice: Social and HistoricalContext, in II ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3, 3336 (1978); see INNOVATIONS IN THE LEGAL SERVICES 177-230 (1980); Hazard, The Efect of he
Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973).
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effectively. 129 Similarly, the development of the class action brought
with it important changes in the rules regulating solicitation, attorney
fees, a lawyer's duties to his clients, and other matters of professional
concern. 130 The government, moreover, defines the legal structure of
corporations, government agencies, classes in class actions, and other entities that lawyers represent. The government, therefore, helps decide to
whom lawyers owe their primary duties, and how those duties should be
131
reconciled with the interests of others.
Although government involvement is inevitable, its impact is not.
The government's efforts to make legal services available to all will inevitably conflict with funding constraints. Bureaucratic rigidity, the influence of lawyers on the government, and political moods that discourage
law reform meant to aid the disadvantaged might also restrict the government's effectiveness. 13 2 Indeed, as the public utility model itself proclaims, the distribution and nature of legal services are important
constituents of our governmental system; reformers, anti-reformers, and
other groups, therefore, will seek to mold them to advance their own
goals. The public utility model, like the market model, thus leaves room
for disagreement over the desirability of specific reforms.
B.

Applications of the Public Utility Model

The public utility model brings three often overlapping goals to the
process of licensing lawyers: broader availability, lower cost, and higher
quality. Allowing and encouraging paralegals to work with or without
lawyers, for example, would reduce the costs of lawyers and enable lawyers to serve more people, 3 3 while some form of licensing or accreditation would exclude or discourage the untrained. I34 Similarly, the
unitary bar could be abandoned. States could license lawyers after two
129

See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101, DR 5-101(B),

DR 5-102, DR 7-102, DR 7-106, DR 7-108, DR 7-109 (1980).

130 See Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 97; Dawson, Lawyers
and Znvoluntag Clients in PublicInterest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849, 915-29 (1975); Developments in the Law-Conflics of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1447-57

(1981).

131
G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 8-10, 37-38, 43-57 (1978); see Developments in the Law, supra note 130, at 1334-52, 1413-22, 1447-57.
132
See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b) (1976 & Supp. 1980)
(prohibiting Legal Services Corporation involvement in certain cases).
133
See, e.g., T. EHRLICH & M. SCHWART , REDUCING THE COSTS OF LEGAL SERVICES:
POSSIBLE APPROACHES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 9-11 (1975); J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS
AT THE BAR 223 (1978); Brickman, supra note 120; see Rhode, Policingthe ProfessionalMonopoly:
A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of UnauthorizedPractice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1

(1981).
134
R. LECLAIR, LEGAL ASSISTANT PROGRAMS: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE (1978); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL ASSISTANTS UPDATE '80 (C. Farren, D. Weisberg & R. Larson eds. 1980); Haskell, Issues in

Paralegalism:Education, Certification,Licensing, UnauthorizedPractice, 15 GA. L. REV. 631 (1981);

see Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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years of law school and fewer than four years of college, I3 5 while imposing requirements more stringent than the current ones for some

functions. 136
Public utility proponents, thus differ from proponents of the traditional model. They would permit paralegals to work without a lawyer's
supervision, even though such a measure would lower fees and reduce
the income of some lawyers. Similarly, they tend to draw away from
measures such as the certification of specialists that, while in some ways
consistent with their program, tend to enrich the bar more than improve
service.' 3 7 Public utility proponents also differ from market theorists,
for they would limit the unauthorized practice of law, retain other quality controls, and actively encourage new alternatives, instead of leaving
their development to the market.
Because the public utility approach seeks to make competent lawyers broadly available, it would seek to foster changes in law schools.
Public utility proponents encourage law schools to admit more minorities, I3 8 more poor people, 39 more women, and perhaps even students
with low grades.' 4° The goal is not simply to benefit those students admitted, but to produce lawyers who will be more responsive to the needs
of all citizens. That goal would also influence placement offices, which
should serve needs beyond those of large corporate firms.' 4 1 Moreover,
during the period between admission and placement-if such a period
still exists-schools would devote greater attention to teaching the skills
needed for client service, including the service of less traditional clients. 142 Because of the public importance of legal training, public utility
proponents would impose such changes even on unwilling law schools if
43
necessary. 1
Proponents of the public utility model also would foster new meth135 A. REED, supra note 107, at 220, 238-39, 417-19; authorities cited supra notes 52-53.
136 See, e.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifcation of
Advocates Essential to our System ofJustice, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973); Comm. to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of
the United States, FinalReport, 83 F.R.D. 215 (1979) (the "Devitt Committee" report).
137

See, e.g., S. TISHER, supra note 108, at 71-85; R. ZEHNLE, SPECIALIZATION IN THE

LEGAL PROFESSION: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PROPOSALS (1975); Mindes, Proliferation,

Specialization and Certification: The Splitting of the Bar, 11 U. TOL L. REv. 273, 291-94 (1980).
138 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973),dismissedasmoot, 416
U.S. 312 (1974); DiradvantagedStudents and LegalEducation--Programsfor Ajitnative Action, 1970
U. TOL. L. REV. 277.
139 20 U.S.C. § 1134r-1 (aiding legal education of the disadvantaged), repealedby Pub. L.
No. 96-374, § 902(b), 94 Stat. 1484 (1980); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa-1087ii (Supp. 1980) (lowinterest loans to graduate students).
140 See Frierson,And the C Students Make Money, 59 A.B.A. J. 61 (1973).
141 Phelps, Law Placement and SocialJustice, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 663 (1978).
142 ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE

LAW SCHOOLS (1979); Nader, Law Schools and Law firms, 54 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1970).
143 See Beytagh, PrescribedCoursesas PrerequisitesforTaking BarExaminations: Indiana'sExper-

PROFESSIONAL REFORM

1982]

1041

ods of obtaining legal services. Some of these-advertising, requiring
lawyers to contribute time to the poor, 144 and requiring defendants to
pay the legal fees of certain successful plaintiffst 4 5--simply bring clients
into contact with lawyers who presumably provide services in the traditional way. Other methods seek to cut the costs of legal services by standardizing them, while improving competence through quality control or
governmental regulation. These methods include legal services offices
that the Legal Services Corporation sponsors,1 46 public defender offices, 147 group service and legal insurance plans, 148 legal clinics, 149 and
class actions.150 One logical extension of these ideas is a governmentally
employed bar established to provide legal services for all members of
society. 15 ' Another extension is encouraging measures designed to channel legal talent into litigation or other activities of special importance. 152
Because of the political importance that the public utility model
ascribes to legal services, proponents of the model have emphasized
group representation. Since the War on Poverty introduced federal legal services to help the poor organize themselves, expanding the availability of lawyers to the poor has been viewed as a means by which
groups lacking political power could bring their concerns to bear on the
government. 53 The large size of excluded groups, combined with the
small number of available lawyers, has encouraged reformers to think in
terms of mass remedies. The political aspect of the public utility apiment in ControllingLegal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUc. 449 (1974) (criticizing court-imposed
prerequisites); Slonim, State Court Tells Law School What to Teach, 67 A.B.A. J. 26 (1981).
144 See, e.g., Christensen, The Lawyers Pro Bono PublicResponsibility, 1981 AM. BAR FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 1; Rosenfeld, Mandato,7 Pro Bono: Historicaland ConstitutionalPerspectives, 2 CARDozo L. REV. 255 (1981). But see Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 735 (1980).
145 See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a) (1980), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1976).
146 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(a)(3), 2996f(a)(1-3), (g); LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

TO THE POOR (1977).
147

See, e.g., NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES GUIDELINES FOR

LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
148
See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES

(1976);

FOUNDATION, LEGAL SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGULATION

AMERICAN BAR

(W. Pfennigstorf & S.

Kimball eds. 1977).
149 See, e.g., Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977);
Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 543-45 (1967).
150 See Berry, Ending SubstancesIndenture to Procedure: The Imperativefor Comprehensive Revision
of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1980) (describing Justice Department
proposals for regulation of class actions).
151
See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, JUSTICE: COMMODITY OR PUBLIC SERVICE (1978).
152 See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factorin Attorn Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 497-507
(1981) (discussing litigation incentives).
153 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429-30 (1963); J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S.
MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1967); Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A
Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE LJ. 1317 (1964); Marks, A Lawyers Duty to Take All Corers and
Many Who Do Not Come, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 915 (1976).

1042

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1021

proach also emphasizes legal services for the poor and unrepresented as
a way to counterbalance the power that the rich enjoy both within and
without the legal system.15 4 The implication of this approach is that the
poor should receive representation equal to or better than that available
to the rich. Only a nonlawyer has suggested the logical conclusion that
access of wealthy clients to legal services be limited. 155
Although the public utility model would design legal services delivery systems with internal controls to ensure low cost and high quality,
direct government control would further protect the public. The government, for example, could prohibit excessive fees, 156 and remodel the
system for calculating fees to remove some of the conflicts of interest
between lawyer and client inherent in today's contingent and hourly fee
systems.15 7 The government could also promulgate standards of competence158 and enforce them through disciplinary proceedings.15 9 Finally,
the government could require lawyers to participate in continuing legal
education and retesting to retain bar membership 160 and subject their
16
work to peer review. '
In some ways, the public utility approach would simply reinvigorate goals that the traditional system of professional responsibility articulated but did not fulfill. The Kutak Commission, for instance,
proposed to strengthen the lawyer's duties to provide competent service,' 62 to keep her client informed, to leave ultimate decisions to the
client,1 65 to refrain from adversary tactics likely to lead to erroneous results,'6 and to attempt to restrain clients from committing illegal
acts. 165 These proposals simply remove the tendency of the old rules to
154

See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 104; Carlin & Howard,

Legal Representation and Classuetice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381 (1965). But see Abel, supra note
125; Galanter, supra note 101.
155
A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 216-17 (1977) (lawyers paid from central fund; fees
proportioned according to client's wealth).
156 Eg., Tunney & Frank, supra note 117, at 342; see J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR
227 (1978) (lawyers should renounce wealth).
157 See Clermont & Currivan, Improving On The Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529
(1978).
158 See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978).
159 See Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Byond the Bar, 69 GEO. L.J. 705
(1981).
160 See Parker, PeriodicRecertifwation of Lawyers: A ComparativeStudy ofProgramsfor Maintaining ProfessionalCompetence, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 463.
161 See ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A MODEL PEER REVIEW
SYSTEM (1980 draft); Winter, EnhancingLawyer Competence, 67 A.B.A. J. 265 (1981).
162 Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, Rules 1.1, 1.3.
163 Id Rules 1.2(a), 1.4.
164 Id Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4(a), (b), 3.8(a), (d); see also Discussion Draft, supra note 81,
Rule 3.1. (Proposed Rules 3.3 and 3.4(a) were diluted in the June 30, 1982, version cited
supra note 6).
165
Earlier drafts went further. See Discussion Draft, supra note 81, Rules 1.7, 2.3, 2.4;
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, Rules 1.2(d) (diluted in the June 30, 1982, version), 1.6(b),
2.1 (1981).
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subordinate the public's interests to the client's interests and the client's
interest to his lawyer's interests. 166 That the Kutak Commission's proposals have aroused so much controversy 167 demonstrates the difficulty
of professional self-reform. Whether the government can raise the quality of legal services more than the organized bar has remains to be seen.
The problems of reshaping professional norms become far thornier,
however, when one confronts the premise of the public utility model:
that a lawyer's acts have a broad social impact. Corporate lawyers, for
instance, can assist management behavior that harms shareholders, consumers, and others. Because the adversary system and the market may
not prevent such harm, the government should intervene. It will require, perhaps, the corporate lawyer to consider shareholder and public
interests when he makes his decisions. 16 But how much consideration
must he give? If the interests of only one other group prevail, for example those of corporate customers, the lawyer may become as dangerously
one-dimensional as he is under the current system of loyalty to management-if, that is, management does not fire him first. Alternatively, if
the lawyer considers all interests, he will have the ultimate authority to
decide which interest prevails, and may impose his own views on the
169
corporation in legal matters.
These problems are not limited to corporate lawyers; they arise
when lawyers represent government agencies, parties in class actions,
unions, and others in legal acts that affect third parties. 170 Indeed, the
public utility model views every lawyer as a public figure who stands in
the center of a web of effects and, therefore, a web of duties. Avoiding
conflicts of interest is impossible; it is necessary to resolve them in light
of public policy. No scheme of public regulation can fully implement
this goal. Nor, perhaps, should it, unless society is willing to replace the
traditional lawyer with a new kind of government official. Moving beyond the traditional system's broad disregard for the social impact of
legal relationships, however, is possible.
Whatever the details of the rules that define the lawyers' duties,
public utility proponents agree that the rules should be more vigorously
enforced in the future than they have been in the past. The importance
of the public interest involved and the bar's history of nominal enforce166 See Morgan, supra note 29.
167 S e Hodes, The Code ofProfessional Responsibilty, The Autak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's
Code: Surprisingly, Three Pear in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 739 (1981).
168 E.g., In re William R. Carter, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (S.E.C. 1981) (lawyers' duty to prevent corporate illegality); Discussion Draft, supra note 81; see Lome, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and ProfessionalEthics, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 425
(1978).
169 See Hegland, ByondEnthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 805, 811-17 (1971).
170 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 129.
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ment 17 1 require that nonlawyers participate in regulating lawyers. 172
Although effective control of abuses cannot be left solely to private remedies, private damages actions could supplement the disciplinary system, with a jury of nonlawyers serving in effect as a supplementary
173
disciplinary panel.
One of the strengths of the public utility model is its tendency to
promote the reshaping of the economic and political context in which
lawyers operate, rather than merely redefining lawyers' duties within
.the present system. Organizing legal services in a new way is one
method of reorientation; changes in procedural and substantive law are
another. Limiting pleading and discovery in civil cases, devising settlement incentives, requiring the loser to pay litigation costs, or diverting
court cases into arbitration and mediation might ease access to the legal
system.1 74 More radically, the adversary system could be partly disman175
tled and the burden of investigating cases shifted to a neutral official.
Changes in the substantive law could reduce and simplify litigation by
176
eliminating complex and frequently-litigated issues.
Although supporters of such changes often emphasize the financial
savings of these proposals, 77 other goals are also at stake. Reductions in
complexity and expense will enable the poor and legally unsophisticated
to participate in the system, albeit at the cost of routinization and perhaps lower quality. 178 Low cost and simplicity, however, are only one
side of a system of reforms. The public utility model's ultimate goal is to
expand the governmental functions of our legal system-as though the
ideal society were a kind of perpetual class action, with everyone properly represented. 179 Yet those who regard lawyers and legal proceedings
171

See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,

supra note 11; S. TISHER, supra note 108, at 86-111; Steele & Nimmer, LAWYERS, CLIENTS
AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 917.
172 See authorities cited supra notes 118, 126.
173 This technique has dangers, as medical malpractice law demonstrates. See Symposium, MedicalMalpractice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1177.
174
E.g., E. JOHNSON, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR

PROCESSING CIL DISPUTES 26-37, 57-71, 80-88 (1978); Nader & Singer, Dispute Resolution,
51 CAL. ST. B.J. 281 (1976); statutes cited supra note 119.
175
E. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 72-79; A. STRICK, supra note 155, at 218; see L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 122-34 (1977).
176 For example, many states have adopted no-fault divorce and no-fault insurance statutes to reduce unnecessary litigation. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 121; see also Carter,
supra note 117; J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 182-90 (1969);
E. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 38-45, 50-55.
177 See, e.g., T. EHRLICH & M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 133.
178 See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-ThePublicInterest in Public
Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Galanter, The Duty Not to Deliver Legal Serices, 30 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 929 (1976).
179 See also Stewart, The Refornation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669
(1975); Yeazell, Intevention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentagy on the Los Angeles School Case,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244 (1977).
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as unnecessary evils, and believe that people can resolve their own disputes through compromise and conciliation, can also espouse some of
these reforms.'1 0 With this suggestion of conflict between legality and
humanity, we reach the third approach to the future of the legal
profession.
IV
THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL

The personal responsibility model calls on lawyers to stop hiding
behind rules, roles, and institutions, and to take responsibility for their
actions. It tells lawyers to replace the traditional lawyer-client relationship, which is often exploitative and dehumanizing, with a relationship
between equal human beings. It denies lawyers the license to do anything not actually illegal to promote their clients' interests. In short, the
model deprofessionalizes the lawyer by requiring him to justify his behavior morally and socially without relying on a code applicable only to
lawyers.
Few recent changes implement this model. The model is relatively
novel, and its supporters disagree about both the causes of dehumanization and its cures. Some emphasize the morality and humanity of the
individual lawyers, while others adopt a political or social stance. 8 1
Furthermore, the personal responsibility approach tends to depreciate
the significance of changes in lawyers' codes; it requires a change of
heart, a change in society, or both. This view's impact on the real world
is, therefore, difficult to trace. We may find evidence of it in a greater
willingness to emphasize values and feelings in law schools, 182 in a new
183
recognition of the potential for conflict between lawyers and clients,
and in a certain malaise with the practice of law and the moral and
personal distortions it is thought to require. 184 Such changes of attitude
are not meaningless; the willingness of young lawyers to forego traditional legal careers has helped expand the availability of legal services
18 5
for the poor.
180

See A. STRICK, supra note 155, at 208-09; Christie, Conf'cIs as Properly, 17 BRIT. J.

CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977).
181 See infra text accompanying notes 187-92.
182 See, e.g., Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: The Sterling ForestGroup, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 561 (1978); Meltsner & Schrag, Scenes From A Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978).
183 See Burt, supra note 83.
184 See C. REICH, THE SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 19-48 (1976); Brazil, The Attorney as
Victim" Toward More Candor About the PchologicalPrice Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL
PROF. 107 (1978). Seegenerall T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND
PEOPLE (1977).
185 See J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT
OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); Finman, OEO LegalService ProgramsAnd The Pursuitof Social Change:
The Relationship Between Program Ideology and Program Performance, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 1001;
Comment, The New PublicInterest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
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Premises and Problems

Like the traditional professional system, the personal responsibility
model focuses on the lawyer-client relationship 8 6 and recognizes its potential for abuse. It emphasizes not just the client's vulnerability but the
lawyer's potential to exploit clients, a result that professionalism itself
may stimulate. The personal responsibility model is concerned with
both lawyer and client as victims of a system of domination inherent in
the traditional structuring of their roles. Furthermore, the lawyer's license to engage in uninhibited partisanship threatens not only the client, but others as well. The traditional system encourages the lawyer to
pursue his client's supposed interests to the limit, perhaps further than
the client would have pursued them, without taking responsibility for
the results.
There are several possible causes of-and accompanying cures
for-this evil. Some personal responsibility proponents point to the personal rigidity and rationalism of lawyers-a problem caused by the personalities of those who decide to become lawyers, and exacerbated by
the traditional system's emphasis on logic and pragmatism instead of
values and feelings.' 87 The cure would be more sensitive and humane
lawyers. Others, however, see dehumanization as inevitable in all social
roles, part of the perpetual conflict between the individual and society.' 88 The role and the social institutions that give rise to the dehumanization might indeed be reshaped to alleviate this conflict, but it
can never be competely removed. Ultimately, each lawyer must struggle
to preserve as much of his soul as possible.
It is also possible to trace exploitation by lawyers to social defects
that should be reformed through political action. Professor Simon, for
instance, attacks the belief that it is necessary or desirable to have professional advocates committed to vindicating any plausibly legal goal of
a client. He would end the conflicts inherent in the lawyer's traditional
role by ending that role itself: he would replace the lawyer with a nonprofessional advocate lacking distinctive codes and prerogatives.' 89
Others view the lawyer as so enmeshed in the exploitations and inequalities of our society that they doubt that tinkering with legal services can
186 See Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 231, 233
(1977) ("The beginning and end of a lawyer's professional life is talking with a client about
what is to be done.").
187 T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 184. But see Simon, Homo Pchologicus: Notes
on a New Legal Formaism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980).
188 See Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721
(1975); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some MoralIssues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).
189 Simon, The Ideology of Advocaty: ProceduralJusticeand ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 29, 130-44; see also Postema,MoralResponsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.

63 (1980).

1982]

PROFESSIONAL REFORM

1047

be effective.190 Both of these views call on lawyers to take responsibility
for the political and social consequences of their. actions. A lawyer
sometimes would have to refuse to assist causes of which he disapproved.
He might also pursue legally unfounded causes if he found them to be
just,' 9 ' or seek to delegitimize all or part of the legal system. A lawyer,
of course, may find it hard to pursue this approach and remain an effective advocate within the existing system.' 92 Disrespect for the present
system may make it difficult to obey its norms, and may evoke hostility
from establishment lawyers and judges.
The personal responsibility school has no enthusiasm for reform
through the promulgation of rules and procedures, whether by the profession or the government. Indeed, it often views legal rules and procedures as a source of dehumanization and as a means to evade
responsibility.1 93 The market system is even more threatening. The
94
model, instead, requires autonomous and responsible human beings.
Yet relying entirely on personal values and feelings leads to self-indulgence, self-deception, arrogance, and misconduct.195 Some proponents
of the personal responsibility model contemplate that responsible lawyers will engage in principled legal and social action, as well as personal
renewal; yet they tell us little about reforms for the legal system, short of
general economic and political change. The personal responsibility
model is intentionally incomplete; it denies that any professional scheme
can yield a generally acceptable answer to some of the questions that
lawyers must face. Compared to personal salvation and the reordering
of society, codes of professional responsibility are unimportant.
The personal responsibility model provides no more guidance for
questions concerning the institutional arrangement of legal services,
such as providing lawyers to the poor. Although the model admonishes
lawyers to live up to their values, values differ, and even those concerned
about poverty and discrimination may consider providing lawyers for
the unrepresented a useless or harmful remedy. 196 Yet the personal re190 Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity andFairnessin PublicInterest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REv. 337, 379-90 (1978); Law, PersonalAnd ProfessionalRoles In Their
Economic And Sexual Contexts, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628 (1978); Wexler, supra note 126; see Abel,
supra note 125.
191 See A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 137-40
(1980) (lawyer should fabricate evidence when childless couple desiring divorce lacks legal

grounds for one).
192 See Wasserstrom, Postcript: Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PrrT. L. REv. 125, 129
(1968).
'93
See, e.g., Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay On The ProfessionalMask, 64 VA. L. REv.
735 (1978); see J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976). But see Simon, supra

note 189.
See generally W. KAUFMANN, WITHOUT GUILT AND JUSTICE (1973).
195 See Simon, supra note 187, at 539-50.
196 See Griffiths, The Distributionof Legal Services in the Netherlands, 4 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y
260, 282-86 (1977).
194
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sponsibility approach is not indifferent to the plight of the poor. Undoubtedly, most of the proponents of this model support the expansion
of legal services; some are leaders in the development of clinical education programs that address the poor and their problems. 19 7 This commitment is appropriate. While some lawyers may find personal
fulfillment as hired guns,1 98 in general those with heightened moral, social, and emotional concerns will care about the needs of the underrepresented. Lawyers, for example, can more easily attain a human,
equal relationship with a tenant than with a corporation.
B.

Applications of the PersonalResponsibility Model

The personal responsibility model, like the market and public utility models, relaxes the prohibition on the provision of legal services by
nonlawyers. The model also supports lay participation in whatever regulation of the bar exists.' 9 9 While the market and public utility models
favor similar reforms primarily to reduce costs, to avoid self-protective
practices by the profession, and to maximize consumer choices, the personal responsibility model embraces these aims and cuts deeper. It seeks
to abolish the professional caste of lawyers, separated from the multitude by law, education, and mystique, and to impose on lawyers the
obligations that society imposes on other members of society. The personal responsibility model views lawyers as people helping people-and
sometimes hurting them. 200 The model criticizes the notion that lawyers
work in a world of legal concepts requiring unique skills. A lawyer who
counsels clients does what other counselors do, and might benefit from
courses in psychology more than from courses in constitutional theory. 20 1 Similarly, many lawyers are wheelers and dealers who try to manipulate bureaucrats, a skill that does not require much legal
20 2
training.
Because of its concern with personal reorientation, the personal responsibility approach has had a significant impact in thinking about
legal education. It has inspired much literature critical of the tendency
See, e.g., Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 182.
198 See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend- The Moral Foundation ofthe Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE LJ. 1060, 1076-78 (1976) (lawyer should not allow social considerations to impede
upon representation of client).
199 See Simon, supra note 189, at 140 n.245.
200 See, e.g., Noonan, DistinguishedAlumni Lecture-OtherPeople's Morals: The Lawyers Conscience, 48 TENN. L. REv. 227 (1981).
197

201

See generaly A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING

PROCESS (1976); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling, 2 CONN. L. REv. 98
(1969); Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young Family Clients and The Pchology of Testation, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 345 (1969).

202 Eg., J. CARLIN, supra note 15; Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as a Confidence Game, 1 L.
& Soc'y REv. 15, 18-24 (1967). For an early attempt to demystify the law and deprofessionalize-indeed, abolish-the profession, see F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939).
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of law schools to terrify students, suppress concern with values and feelings, and encourage conformity, pragmatism, and verbal manipulation.203 One proposed response increases the emphasis on personal
values and feelings.20 4 Another would use clinical education to force
students to confront their relations with clients, the discrepancy between
legal ideals and realities, and their own ambivalence about being
20 5
lawyers.
The personal responsibility model provides an interesting perspective on the formation of the lawyer-client relationship. To eradicate the
special legal status that divides lawyers from other people, the model
would presumably permit all forms of advertising, solicitation, and contractual arrangements not otherwise illegal. Lawyers, however, would
remain responsible, morally if not legally, for each decision to solicit or
to refrain. Furthermore, lawyers would have to evaluate each decision
on its own merits, not on the American Bar Association's code. A lawyer
might have a duty to solicit certain clients in some circumstances, such as
when it is necessary to inform them of the possibility of redress for injuries.2 0 6 On the other hand, lawyers might refrain from mass advertising
20 7
because of its impersonality and oversimplification.
As with advertising and solicitation, the propriety of various fee arrangements would depend on the lawyer's assessment of the circumstances. The wealth of the client, the merits of the case, the quality of
the opposing party's representation, and other factors would affect a
lawyer's decision to charge a fee, its size, and whether to set the fee according to a contingency, hourly, or other basis. Under one view, the
client should not pay the lawyer directly. Instead, the government, a
203 See, e.g., Cramton, The OrdinargReligion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
247, 250 (1978); Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, I YALE REv. L. & Soc. AcTION 71 (1970); Savoy, Toward A New Politics of Legal Eduction, 79 YALE LJ. 444, 455-62
(1970); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REV. 392 (1971).
204 See, e.g., Auerbach, What Has The Teaching Of Law To Do WithJustice?, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 457, 466-74 (1978); Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquigy Into the Application
of Humanistic EducationalPychology To The Teaching Of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514 (1978); see
also authorities cited supra note 182.
205 See, e.g., Bellow, On Teachingthe Teachers: Some Preliminaty Reflections on ClinicalEducation
asMethodology, reprintedin CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 394-401 (1973);
Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 182.
206 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422-25 (1978) (first amendment permits nonprofit organizations to solicit prospective litigants as a form of political expression). V. COUNTRYMAN,
T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 632, 637 (2d ed. 1976)
(Report of the Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievance of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, In the matter of Advertising Conducted by Monroe H. Freedman and The
Stern Community Law Firm) (offer of assistance to those wishing to adopt child deemed
"reasonably within the bounds of dignity and good taste. .. ".
207 This is somewhat contrary to the prevalent approach that views advertising as less
coercive than solicitation. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454-68
(1978) (state bar could discipline lawyer for solicitation) with Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 381-83 (1977) (advertising protected by first amendment).
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group service plan, or a charitable foundation would finance the lawyer,
leaving the attorney-client relationship relatively uncontaminated by
208
financial pressures.
The personal responsibility model's concern with conflict and ambivalence becomes particularly apparent in the area of attorney-client
relations. The approach expressly rejects as manipulative the traditional theory's position that the client must place his affairs in the hands
of a professional and trust him. Rather, it requires the client to retain
responsibility, and the lawyer to inform the client and defer to the client's decisions. 20 9 Yet the lawyer, like her client, is an autonomous person responsible for her behavior. She retains the right and duty to
refrain from morally repugnant acts, to counsel clients against them,
and perhaps even to prevent clients from performing them.2 10 Indeed,
the view of the lawyer as quasi-therapist that some suggest 2 l , might create a new, albeit concealed, dominance of the lawyer over her client by
encouraging her to become involved in the client's decisions.
Several authors have proposed dialogue between lawyer and client
as the solution to the conflict in the attorney-client relationship.2 1 2 The
two should openly discuss the client's objectives, the lawyer's goals and
interests, and the personal and social ramifications of alternative courses
of action. It is difficult to conduct a dialogue between equals, however,
when one monopolizes the legal knowledge and the other's interests are
at stake. Ultimately, dialogue proponents hope, a responsible and mutually acceptable solution will emerge. If not, each party must have a
broad right to end the attorney-client relationship.2 1 3 Free exit is not a
panacea, however, because it leaves unresolved the difficulties of dealing
with the commitments of money and time already invested by the lawyer and client.2 1 4 Nor does free exit address the the possibility that the
lawyer will use confidential information acquired from the client for his
own benefits or to further social goals.2 1 5 Under a system of deprofessionalization, it is not clear whether anyone could regulate these mat208 The traditional professional View, by contrast, considers such arrangements as sources
of interference with the lawyer's duty to his client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-22, EC 5-23, EC 5-24 (1980).
209 See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 8 (suggesting shared responsibility between lawyer and client); Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, Rules 1.2(a), 1.4: Luban, Patemalism and
the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454.
210 See Discussion Draft, supra note 81 Rule 1.2(c), 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(2) (diluted in Proposed
Final Rules, supra note 6); Simon, supra note 189, at 132.
211 See authorities cited supra note 201.
212 E.g., Burt, supra note 83; Shaffer, supra note 186; see Lehman, The Pursuit fa Client's
Interest, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1078 (1979).
213 Discussion Draft, supra note 81, Rule 1.16(b) (diluted in Proposed Final Rules, supra
note 6, Rule 1.16(b)); Simon, supra note 189, at 132-33.
214 Eg., Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972) (lawyer
dismissed without cause entitled to quantum meruit recovery rather than contingent fee).
215 See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.) (attorney
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ters. It does not, however, appear satisfactory to leave them to the
consciences of lawyers and clients and the agreements they may have
made.
Nonclients pose further problems for the personal responsibility approach. After lawyer and client have concluded their dialogue, they
may unite to victimize others, without even the minimal restraints of
traditional rules. At least, however, the personal responsibility model
encourages lawyers and clients to consider the impact of their decisions
on others.2 16 Moreover, nonclients may seek to join the dialogue, engaging clients, lawyers, or both in discussions of their plans. Today, such a
discussion is difficult. Clients are encouraged to avoid questions with
the refrain that "the matter is in legal hands," while lawyers take refuge
in their duty to advance their clients' interests, or refuse to discuss legal
matters with nonlawyers at all.2 1 7 Under the personal responsibility
model, neither lawyers nor clients should be able to avoid questions regarding their affairs-or avoid critical editorials, pickets, and other appeals to the public.
One way of limiting power and protecting third parties is to impose
liability on lawyers by treating them like any other of the client's accomplices.2 18 The personal responsibility approach, with its belief in
deprofessionalization, may require that tort and criminal liability replace professional regulation. This suggestion might not be such a drastic change, because professional discipline now falls primarily on
21 9
convicted criminals, embezzlers, and other violators of general law.
Such an approach still requires the formulation of standards of conduct
for those, whether or not lawyers, who represent others in legal matters.
Traditional problems of professional responsibility would thus recur.
The organization of legal services presents an even more intractable
problem. Proponents of the personal responsibility model tend to support the provision of legal services to the poor and reject the rationing of
legal services on the basis of cash. 220 This implies a commitment to publicly-funded legal services offices, group service plans, legal insurance
plans, and low-priced legal clinics that attract customers through advertisement. Yet such institutions also generate practices that the personal
responsibility model opposes, such as the mass production of legal servdisclosed confidential securities information to SEC and also to defend himself against accusations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
216

See Discussion Draft, supra note 81, Rule 3.4(a) (diluted in Proposed Final Draft, supra

note 6, Rule 4.4).
217 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-104 (restrictions on communicating dirrctly with adverse party); Leubsdorf, sufira note 18.
218 See cases cited sufira note 91.
219
See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 171, at 993-99 (disciplinary actions against
lawyers).
220 See supra text accompanying note 197.
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ices, bureaucratic rigidity, and the imposition of policies on lawyers and
clients. 22 ' Expanding the lawyer-client dialogue to include institutional
management issues, and including lawyers, other employees, clients, and
other groups in the dialogue may alleviate some of these problems. To
the extent that problems remain, as they certainly will, proponents of
the personal responsibility model can find solace by recognizing that
inadequate funding and bureaucracy constrain most institutions in our
society, especially those seeking to serve the poor.
The themes of ambivalence and impossibility that pervade this discussion of the personal responsibility approach are not accidental.
These problems reflect the model's competing concerns and goals. Some
proponents are concerned with the personal insensitivity of lawyers,
while others are uneasy with the adversary society in which lawyers
must work. The approach proclaims the importance of values, but
leaves individuals with the choice of which values to emphasize. It promotes an ideal of personal responsibility, but endorses mass service
mechanisms likely to overwhelm individuals. One might consider these
contradictions illustrative of a fundamentally flawed approach-an approach born of yearning for an impossible world of wholly personal and
moral relationships and reflecting a deep repugnance to lawyering as it
is currently practiced. Yet, these difficulties also reflect the unwillingness of the model's proponents to hide behind a set of rules, and a willingness to consider the ideals of justice, the disillusionments of reality,
and the depth of today's conflicts. The approach does not provide a
wealth of specific proposals for efforts at law reform. It does provide a
valid perspective on the problems facing lawyers.
CONCLUSION

It is impossible to reconcile the three views described here. They
reflect radically different approaches to the functions of legal services in
our society. Nevertheless, they occasionally follow different paths to the
same conclusion. All three models undercut, at least in part, two pillars
of the old professional system: lawyers' monopoly on the provision of
legal services and self-regulation by the bar. Yet, even here agreement is
limited. Differences reappear for example when we ask who, if anyone,
should regulate the bar.
Although the models cannot be reconciled, compromise is possible.
Indeed, while a few authors come close to representing one view or another in its pure form, 222 even they do not necessarily embrace it in all of
221

See Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problem.

CASE 106 (1977).

The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEF-

222 See, e.g., S. TIsHER, L. BERNABEI & M. GREEN, supra note 108 (public utility view);
Huber, supra note 58 (market view); Simon, supra notes 187, 189 (personal responsibility approach: sociopolitical variant).
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its applications. Conversely, most of us can find some merit in each of
the three models. The Kutak Commission's proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, for instance, contain some innovations from each
model. 223 That is not surprising, because each model grows out of one
of the fundamental questions that every thoughtful lawyer has asked:
How should lawyers deal with their clients? What may a lawyer do to
nonclients? How can I live with myself?
I believe that the public utility approach should be the starting
point for thought and reform. That approach is founded on a valid
perception of the significance of lawyers in our society and the impact of
lawyers on clients and third parties. Reform through the efforts of
nonlawyers and lawyers working through the government, while certainly susceptible to failure and capture by those being regulated, seems
more promising than reliance on the bar, the market, or the conscience
of individual lawyers. The goal of a publicly-regulated profession is a
realistic one in our society. Finally, the flexibility of the model makes it
possible to shape it to meet particular problems and to incorporate contributions of other models.
The market model also has something to contribute. In those areas
in which clients can protect themselves and nonclients will not be
harmed, such as the selection of lawyers by paying clients or the use of
nonlawyers to provide legal services, the market can regulate adequately. The market model also tends to counterbalance the excesses of
the public utility model, such as ascribing a disproportionate value to
access to lawyers, underestimating the costs of a society permeated by
lawyers, and supporting paternalistic regulation to the extent that it
does more harm than good. Yet, abandoning all regulation in favor of
the market would be like replacing law itself with the market, or selling
court decisions and statutes to the highest bidder.224 The arrangements
affecting legal services, like law, are unavoidably entangled in governmental decisions. Control over those arrangements is needed to ensure
the integrity of legal rights traded in the market, to protect third parties,
and to limit the power of the wealthy. Furthermore, even when markets
are operating within their proper limits, they often fail to bring the benefits their defenders predict. 225 The last thing we need to do is to encourage lawyers to believe that private greed will bring public benefit.
The personal responsibility approach can help guide behavior
223 Se supra notes 58, 70, 81, 162-65, 168. The Commission's original 1980 proposals
reflecting the personal responsibility view have suffered from subsequent revision and retrenchment. See supra notes 6, 209, 210, 213, 216.
224 For favorable account of a market models of lawmaking, see, e.g., Landes & Posner,
The ndependentJudiciap'in an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (legislation);
Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efiient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (adjudication).
225 It is perverse to regard the present arrangements for the creation and marketing of
junk foods as an ideal to which lawyers should aspire.
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within a given system of rules and institutions. It also provides suggestions for reshaping the system, such as remodeling legal education and
rethinking the principles that should govern attorney-client relations.
More important, however, is its assertion that no system can excuse lawyers from responsibility for their behavior. It calls on each lawyer to
confront the realities of the system in which he works-the disregarded
rules, the unjust rules, the rules that are just in themselves, but that
amplify injustice elsewhere in society-and to act in the light of those
realities. Its weakness is that it offers little guidance on how he should
act. Each lawyer must conduct his own appraisal-an appraisal that
226
leads me for the most part to support the public utility model.

In the long run the choice of a model for reform can have important, albeit limited, significance. No theory will prevent some trends in
the practice of law from running their course. Larger firms, more lawyers working outside traditional firms, more paralegals working with or
without lawyers, more mass production and bureaucratization of legal
services, more governmental involvement and regulation, and a somewhat slower expansion of the bar are all inevitable. Yet, ideas have influenced past changes in the legal services system, and will undoubtedly
influence future changes. 22 7 To avoid undesirable changes, we must
consider the implications of proposed reforms and their consistency with
other proposals. To avoid being carried by piecemeal reforms into a
world of unexpected unpleasantness, we must decide where to go and
how to get there.

226 Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 190, reach similar conclusions.
227 Who can doubt, for instance, that the legitimation of lawyer advertising by Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) owed much to the erosion over the decades of the theory that
commercial speech was exempt from the first amendment? See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); Developmentr
in the Law--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAPv. L. REv. 1005, 1027-38 (1967).

